The January 25th Uprisings: Through or in Spite of Civil Society? by Abd el Wahab, Ayman
1 Introduction
The uprisings that led to the ousting of
President Mubarak have left many
organisations in a state of confusion over how
they should respond to the new political setting,
which is highly politicised. Many organisations
now realise they need to engage differently.
Development organisations realise that they
can no longer pursue an apolitical approach to
development. Charity organisations previously
aligned to the ruling regime need to rethink the
terms of their engagement in society, while
many associations are now thinking: how do we
engage the youth? This article traces some of
the historical and political developments
influencing the nature and kind of society that
we had prior to and after the revolution and
how it impacted on the values espoused by
leaders and their organisations working in these
arenas. It explores how organisations engage
politically, and its implications for
strengthening civil values in society. It argues
that as long as we ignore the core civic
associations that represent the majority of
organisations on the ground, we will always be
working on the fringes.
2 A nascent civil society
Since their establishment in the nineteenth
century, Egypt associations have assumed
multiple roles in society; for example,
contributing to political education and shaping
Egypt’s political culture, while some functioned
as lobby and interest groups and movements for
social advancement, and many acted as the
prime agents of raising social awareness and
expanding the parameters of democratic space.
However, the emergence of such associations and
the evolution of organisational life suggest that it
was not a cumulative process: state intervention
ruptured this process at several junctures,
preventing the construction of a deep-rooted civil
society capable of supporting and developing a
strong society, containing state power, and
promoting a civil value system. In contemporary
Egypt, the severe political restrictions imposed
by a series of authoritarian governments on civil
freedoms were compounded by the poor
organisational and institutional capacities of
most civil society groups and the dominance of a
traditional culture. Such factors have all served
to turn these organisations and the roles they
play into civic rather than civil organisations.
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The agenda and activities of civic organisations
are strongly tied to traditional components of
Egyptian agricultural and tribal society, as well
as its modern components.
Civil society is based on social and cultural
diversity and is grounded in organisations,
leagues, and unofficial coalitions committed to
social, cultural, political and economic change
through the dissemination of civic values, human
rights, civic responsibility and active citizenship
(CIDA 2011). Civic society, on the other hand, is
largely based on ethnic, racial, and traditional
affiliations, which is clear in developing countries
where civic organisations often emerge to serve
members of a particular tribe or family, or a
specific ethnic group. Indeed, it may be said that
civic society and its role is an expression of the
development of the society in which it operates.
Egyptian society possesses a more active civic,
rather than civil society in the Western sense of a
society that strives to disseminate civic values.
The long history of civic action and its evolution
over time helps shed light on why advocacy and
rights-based groups were stronger in nineteenth
century Egypt than today. The relationship
between the state and civil society has been
greatly affected by levels of interventionism in
relation to both values and roles (Abd el Wahab
2000: 4–9). Moreover, there are other factors
that ultimately act as constraints and obstacles
impeding the agency of civil society organisations
– its constituent organisations and the elite who
run them, as well as the surrounding
environment and how conducive it is to activism.
Egyptian civic action is distinguished from other
areas in the region by its long history, the
positive role it played in resisting colonialism
and promoting enlightenment, the
organisational and functional role it played as
part of state policy in the 1950s and 1960s
(General Federation of Associations and Private
Institutions 1983) and the role it played as the
state turned toward political pluralism and
economic liberalisation in the 1970s. Currently,
many organisations are still nascent but lack
autonomy, which is reflected in a lack of financial
self-sufficiency, members’ non-committal
payment of association dues, weak
administrative and financial structures, a lack of
dedicated employees or qualified volunteers, and
minimal rotation of power at the board level.
3 Scoping of civic associations and its
asymmetries
Civil society in Egypt evinces two levels of social
participation: the small, micro-level, represented
by civic associations, and the medium level,
which takes the form of professional syndicates
and trade unions. The social and economic
importance of civic associations is visibly
quantitative: a little more than 30,000 of a total
of 45,000 non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and qualitatively in terms of visibility. In
terms of quantity, second to civic associations are
cooperatives (production, agricultural, housing,
consumer, water), which number 13,162, then
clubs and youth centres (5,410), and finally
professional and labour unions and the Egyptian
Trade Union Federation (46 syndicates in the
federation).1
Civic associations are also more active and
visible than other types of organisational forms.
Over the last ten years, the number of these
associations has grown, as have their
socioeconomic contributions, which may increase
dependence on them in the near future.
There were 30,214 civic associations in 2010, up
from 25,992 in 2009, 18,662 in 2004, and 13,239
in 1991.2 It is estimated that in 2004, civic
associations served nearly 30 million citizens,
according to official statements. Some 3 million
Egyptians are members of civic associations,
compared to 5 million who are members of
professional syndicates and 3.5 million who
belong to labour unions (Qandil 2004). This
indicates that the growth of civic associations,
particularly development associations, was
unaffected by the instability of the legislative
framework governing civic action for nearly two
years, from the issuance of Law 153/1999, which
was declared unconstitutional in June 2000, to
the issuance of Law 84/2002 which imposed
repressive bureaucratic restrictions on non-
governmental activity.
A number of asymmetries served to inhibit civic
associations from playing a civil or developmental
role:
First, the increase in the number of associations
starting in the late 1980s is a reflection of the
desire to fill the gaps left as the state retreated
from some welfare roles, and the emergence of
new areas of engagement such as advocacy, the
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protection of the environment, income
development, and women’s and children’s issues.
Second, the services offered by social
development associations benefited all segments
of society – to varying degrees. In a study on the
role of civic organisations in combating poverty
Dr ‘Ali Layla noted that most social groups
benefited from these services, either through
empowerment or direct aid. In total, 54 per cent
of activities were oriented to children, 38.2 per
cent to women, 33.2 per cent to youth, 12.3 per
cent to the elderly and 9.3 per cent to the
disabled (Layla 2002). It is important to note
that ‘benefit’ here refers to objects/recipients of
intervention, rather than active subjects
participating in the formulation, implementation
or evaluation of the initiatives.
Third, the discrepancies in the geographic
distribution of associations – with the
governorates of Cairo, Giza and Alexandria
hosting the largest number of groups, about
29 per cent – is matched by another disparity in
the spheres of social action. Indeed, since the
emergence of associations, they have focused
largely on three areas: (1) social development;
(2) cultural, academic and religious services; and
(3) social aid. The sector of cultural, academic,
and religious services is the largest single sector,
accounting for 25.28 per cent of activities,
followed by social aid with 21.28 per cent.
Fourth, a comparison of the geographic
distribution of associations with the development
ranking of governorates indicates no relationship
between development status and a greater
concentration of associations. This is manifested
in the mismatch between associations and the
needs of governorates.
Fifth, there is no direct correlation between size
of membership and political weight. For
example, there are some businessmen’s
associations that, despite their relatively small
membership, have a disproportionately large
economic, political, and social impact. The
lawyers’ syndicate is more active and influential
in public life than the teachers’ syndicate,
although it has fewer members (Abdullah 1995).
By and large, NGOs have had a very limited
impact on policy-making, partly due to the
political environment, partly due to capacity
deficiencies and partly due to their failure to
mobilise through coalition building.
The government welcomed and fostered
charitable work as it met needs and
strengthened social security and stability in
spheres from which the state was retreating. Yet,
the government was less encouraging about civic
associations’ advocacy and development roles (in
planning and assessment), as these entailed a
critical perspective aimed at policy reform (Abd
el Wahab 2000: 5–6). This situation helps to
explain partly why they were not prominent as
actors in the January revolution.
4 Politicised civic rather than civil engagement
The critical factors in determining the nature of
the political role of civil society and its
contribution to the January revolution are the
contextual restrictions or constraints on society.
There are relevant legal and political
considerations, namely the government’s
rejection of any quasi-political roles, even those
based on advocacy. This is seen, for example, in
its rejection of civil society election monitoring,
the exclusion of civic organisations from
policymaking circles and the refusal to accept
civic organisations as a partner in development.
This is embodied in numerous laws (e.g. the
NGO law and the trade union law), the freezing
of nearly one-quarter of the professional
syndicates (eight syndicates), and the
controversy over the role of the judges’ clubs in
political life (see Ali, this IDS Bulletin). Most
civic associations have no wish to clash with the
government and the values they uphold are non-
confrontational, as they do not see themselves as
having a role of contesting state power or
holding it to account. It is thus evident that it is
difficult to talk about a clear, influential political
role for civic associations in general before or
during the January revolution.
From 2005, when political space was relaxed,
many parties and political forces, whether pro-
or anti-regime also began to use civil society
organisations, in particular civic associations, for
their own political ends. The most prominent
manifestations of this as seen in the 2005 and
2010 elections are outlined below.
Civic associations and some parts of civil society
were successfully used to communicate with
voters and highlight the candidate’s role in
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serving his district. This encouraged many
independent and party candidates to establish
civic associations and organisations linked to
themselves or their families. They also sought to
connect with the district and its residents by
offering aid to charitable associations and social
development associations.
The field report of the women’s committees in the
presidential elections (2005) and parliamentary
elections (2005 and 2010), issued by the Egyptian
Center for Women’s Rights, revealed that during
the elections, civic associations were used politically
to support certain National Democratic Party
(NDP) candidates. Their financial and material
resources and transportation details were made
available to these candidates in a flagrant violation
of Article 11 of the NGO law. Association resources
allocated for other purposes were used to mobilise
women, particularly poor women, by exploiting
their need to vote. Many poor women and female
heads of households who benefit from state services
were mobilised to vote, leading to a higher turnout
of women, despite general low levels of voter
participation. Women registered on the voter roles
were given the red voting cards in the week running
up to the vote. While this is a positive trend in
principle, in this case, the service was limited solely
to female members of the NDP (ECWR 2005).
The Muslim Brotherhood used civic associations
during the elections. Several Muslim
Brotherhood Candidates who won seats
maintained links with the branches of civic
associations in their electoral districts. Some gave
speeches in their mosques, while others
supervised or participated in their social or
charitable activities, while still others played
important roles in these associations’ tithing
committees (Al-Magid 2008). Through these
associations, candidates connected with dozens of
hospitals, clinics, orphanages, literacy
programmes, training centres and social centres
(see Siam, this IDS Bulletin).
It is very difficult to separate the overlapping
roles of businessmen and their social
responsibility from the manipulation of their
charitable and social works for political (within
parliament) and social gain.
These cases all indicate an increasing
politicisation of civic organisations rather than a
greater role in fostering civil values. This
negative instrumentalisation of charitable and
social work is a way of meeting citizens and
winning their votes; or using the capacities and
resources of these associations – human
resources, international grants and domestic
donations – to promote a particular political
trend, person or party.
What is argued here is that while political
partisanship is undermining the growth of a civil
culture, nevertheless organisations do need to
have a role in the politics of the country by
fostering the values of citizenship. This would
mean assuming an indirect political role through
youth education, promoting of a rights-based
approach to learning and the promotion of
participation. These programmes and activities
must be based on the foundation of citizenship,
without discrimination on political or other
grounds.
5 The build up to the revolution through new
civil actors rather than civic associations
A number of important political and social groups,
such as the Judges Club, assumed prominence
when political restrictions on activism were
relaxed in 2005. Some civil movements demanded
political and civil rights, such as Kifaya (Enough),
April 6th, and a few professional syndicates. Their
activism can be compared with the weak,
disinterested performance of the vast majority of
Egyptian civic society groups.
During the event itself and the aftermath, it is
clear that syndicates and trade unionists played a
prominent role in the uprising, followed by
several other civil society groups, but in their
individual, not organisational, capacity.
The revolution exposed a structural crisis in the
relationship between the state and several civil
society organisations, namely professional
syndicates and labour unions. This crisis was
evident in the syndicates’ relationships with their
bases and with the political regime. The
Mubarak regime attempted to control and
dominate the professional elite that sat at the
top of the syndicate structure through various
legal, political, security and professional means,
creating a deep rift between the syndicate elite
and their professional and labour bases. This
stoked a perpetual conflict between the two
parties, as a result of which syndicates lost their
legitimacy to represent their bases, prompting
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the emergence of dozens of independent, parallel
professional organisations, such as Engineers
Without Custodianship and the March 9th
movement (Adli 2011: 135–44), which
participated in the January 25th revolution.
Moreover, many professionals took part in the
uprising as individuals and citizens, including
doctors, artists, teachers and pharmacists, and
their demands combined the political and the
narrowly professional.
There were differences among the syndicate
leadership. Most syndicate leaders supported the
former regime and opposed the revolution or
were silent about it, while the syndicate boards
tended to support the revolution. This provoked a
conflict within professional and labour unions
that pitted the syndicate heads against the boards
and members of the syndicates. This conflict was
also bound up with numerous professional,
parochial demands that syndicate heads had long
been unable to resolve. The best example is the
conflict between journalists and Makram
Muhammad Ahmad, the head of the Journalists
Syndicate and the board, and which eventually
led to him stepping down from his position.
Independent or parallel professional
organisations also had a strong presence. These
organisations supported the revolution, the
opposition, and the demand for the overthrow of
the regime and its symbols. Demands were also
made for union diversity, the dissolution of the
Egyptian Trade Union Federation, and the
founding of a parallel federation. Several new
trade syndicates were formed. Thus, union issues
were prominent during the January 25th
revolution and in subsequent developments.
Rather than being forwarded as individual
stances, they emerged through clear
organisational forms, as trade unions allied with
other civil society organisations to oust the
regime and build a new system based on the rule
of law and institutions. Particularly prominent
was the stance of the university faculty clubs:
some 1,000 professors organised a large march
against the regime on 8 February demanding the
ousting of Hani Hilal, then the minister of
higher education. The participants included Dr
Essam Sharaf, the Prime Minister residing over
the transitional government. This highlighted
the crisis of legitimacy that existed within most
professional syndicates in Egypt (Adli 2011: 144).
5.1 Learning to become a citizen outside the civic/civil
space
The January 25th revolution stirred many
stagnant waters, and this was accomplished by a
generation of politically conscious, educated
Egyptian youth. The youth’s preference to
exercise their agency through a virtual space
rather than that of civic association is party
driven by choice, partly by circumstance.
In addition to the age-biased leadership, they
considered many of the civic associations as
extension of the government. Joining
professional syndicates in order to practice a
profession or obtain certain services was not an
effective tool of youth participation. Regarding
the quality of youth representation in civic
associations, there is very little youth
participation in general assemblies and decision-
making positions (e.g. administrative boards).
The 45–65 age cohort dominates on both levels;
there are only a very few youth members and
most of these are in the 25–35 age cohort.
Moreover, young women participate even less in
civic associations than young men. Some field
studies (Qandil 2007) indicate that women’s
participation is linked to certain fields, including
religious charitable work and some advocacy
work, particularly in the sphere of women and
children’s rights. In contrast, young men are
prevalent in scientific and technological
organisations. It should be noted as well that
advocacy associations and organisations boast
higher rates of youth participation.
It is also important to note that some youth (and
other segments of Egyptian society) see foreign
funding for advocacy groups as a means to
breach Egyptian national security and turn
public opinion in support of foreign agendas, and
they believe there are double standards for
democracy and human rights norms. This
perspective has been adopted by some
revolutionary youth, and is supported by explicit
accusations from the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces (SCAF) against several
associations that receive funds from abroad and
also the beginning of official government
investigations into this thorny issue. This is a
continuation of the long-standing controversy in
Egypt on foreign funding and its relationship
with international agendas and interference in
domestic affairs. It has cast a dark shadow over
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the role of some civic associations, particularly
advocacy groups and some youth movements and
coalitions (Al-Akhbar 2011).
Religious civic associations (Islamic and
Christian) adopt religious discourses as a means
of attracting the youth through their religious
component. The youth have participated in these
associations in various ways, as targets of their
services or as volunteers. However, civil and civic
associations represented closed spaces for these
youth, since they were primarily dominated by
the older generation and no change of power.
In such a context, the youth sought to counter
this through two main mechanisms: establish
their own organisations and/or turn to virtual
participation. For example, the increase in the
number of associations (30,000 in 2010) over the
past five years was accompanied by an increase
in the number of youth associations (still small
at 311). Of these, 60 per cent were established
between 2003 and 2006. This indicates a growing
desire and awareness among youth to establish
and run their organisations far from the
dominance of the older generation (Arab
Network of Civic Organizations 2006).
In contrast, virtual participation enabled them to
create parallel arenas of engagement: through
social networks, joining initiatives and creating
unorganised, unofficial groups as a means to
participate in society and exercise civic
responsibility.
6 Conclusion
In post-Mubarak Egypt, there is a very strong
political society and a very weak civil society. The
political configurations are such that political
forces, groups and parties are vying for power, in
particular in a context where all are preparing for
the upcoming elections that will give shape to the
new political landscape of Egypt. We saw
manifestations of this already in the constitutional
referendum of March 2011, whereby civic
associations with a religious orientation, whether
Muslim or Christian, sought to influence citizens’
voting preferences. The instrumentalisation of
civic associations will also be one of the principle
ways in which individual candidates, who were
formerly part of the Mubarak regime, will seek to
reach out to citizens, given that they can no longer
rely on the former ruling NDP to prop them up. It
is likely that all political forces including religious,
liberal and leftist parties, the April 6th
movement, and the March 9th movement, will use
civic associations as bridges for outreach. In the
process, they are likely to expand the scope of
action and influence of civic organisations in the
coming elections to the extent that they will play
overtly political roles during elections.
The fact that many civic associations will become
deeply entrenched in partisan political activism
will undermine its ability to play a broader role
in strengthening civic values in society.
Consequently, it seems that civil society is not up
to fulfilling its role as a prime agent for reform
and change. For it to assume such a role requires
that major civic associations (some 4,000
associations) play a greater role in setting the
agenda. This requires collective action through
building umbrella organisations that encompass
smaller associations. It also requires the
formation of coalitions and networks that
disseminate a civic culture and values, both
within and between institutions. The need for a
reorganised civil society demands a greater
degree of cooperation and linkage between civic
organisations (represented by civic leagues, civic
associations, etc.) and civil society groups.
This cooperation should integrate the vertical
role played by civil society organisations (that
focus on policy influence) with the horizontal
role of civic associations. Without such
integration, it is difficult to imagine an effective
role for civic associations – where charitable and
welfare activities still account for 75 per cent of
their activities – in development, good
governance, and democracy promotion in the
near and long term.
In societies that have not completely
modernised, such as Egypt, where the traditional
and the modern still compete, it is preferable to
rely on a link between civic and civil societies as
the foundation for state–society relations and as
a foundation on which to build a vision of the
role of society and its responsibilities for issues of
development and democracy. The civic concept
will provide a more expansive framework to
contain civil forces next to rural and traditional
forces without inflaming sensitivities or stoking
clashes between urban and rural forces and
cultures, particularly given the ‘ruralisation’ of
cities seen in many countries around the world,
among them Egypt. The migration of rural
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communities to cities has entailed the transfer of
culture, beliefs, and forms of civic organisation
such as traditional leagues. This requires a focus
on culture and civic values, fostering a social and
cultural environment conducive to democratic
practice. Then translating it into a lived, daily
reality and harnessing the momentum of some
civil society groups, particularly the professional
syndicates and labour unions. For example,
parallel syndicates that emerged prior to the
revolution (teachers, journalists, doctors, and
engineers) have begun declaring themselves
independent unions, and for the first time, there
is a move to establish a farmers’ syndicate.
The political manipulation of associations, the
prevalence of a philosophy of charitable work
geared to needs, and the eschewing of genuine
empowerment for all segments of society are all
a product of the political regime’s desire to fill
the gaps left by its abandonment of social
responsibilities, contain popular anger and
preserve its legitimacy. The intertwining of
economic and political influence has also helped
to create an environment inhospitable to civil
society. For example, some businessmen have
been more prominent in founding civic
organisations, funding them, or creating entities
to receive funding to serve their own political
ends.
We also need to build the institutional capacities
of civil society organisations and this in turn
requires the injection of new blood into these
organisations. Just as the involvement of
attorneys in advocacy organisations helped to
develop and expand the sphere, the current
moment requires the entry of youth cadres and
new blood among the elite and activists who
work in the civic and civil associations.
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Notes
1 These numbers were collected by the author
from several official sources.
2 The number of associations was taken from
the Ministry of Social Affairs (1991) and the
data issued by the General Federation of
Associations and Private Institutions.
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